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Abstract
Theoretical approaches to information and incentive problems in
analyzing multinational firms’ behavior remain under-examined. I
present a model that explains a multinational firm’s choice of organi-
zational form of its intermediate goods production in the south, which
includes FDI and outsourcing. In the case of outsourcing in the south,
the multinational firm is faced with an adverse selection problem as
the productivity information about the production is the stand-alone
supplier’s private information. In the case of FDI, although the in-
formation problem has been resolved through integration, the foreign
ownership of the supplier brings a new problem to the MNE, as the
monitoring from the northern owner is more costly compared with the
domestic monitoring.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed rapid growth of Foreign Direct Investment
(henceforth FDI), intra-firm trade and Multinational Enterprises (hence-
forth MNEs). Navaretti et al. (2004) illustrate some facts of FDI in their
book and the first one they write is, “FDI grew dramatically in the last
15 years of the twentieth century, far outpacing the growth of trade and in-
come”. With the rapid growth of FDI, intra-firm trade has been a dominant
feature of international trade1. In the real world, FDI and intra-firm trade
are conducted by MNEs which are playing key roles in international econ-
omy today. It has been reported that MNEs-headquarters and subsidiaries
combined-are responsible for 75% of the world’s commodity trade (Dunning,
1993).
Other than FDI, when going to developing countries for the production
of intermediate goods, MNEs can use outsourcing, which means that MNEs
buy intermediate goods from independent intermediate goods suppliers in
the south, as the production pattern of intermediate goods. Outsourcing has
expanded dramatically in the past two decades, especially in international
trade of intermediate goods2. Antra`s points out, in the comparison between
FDI and outsourcing, there is one important finding from the empirical
work, “Intra-firm trade (FDI) is heavily concentrated in capital-intensive
industries (Antra`s, 2003).” This is an interesting phenomenon which some
trade economists tried to explain. In the seminal work of Antra`s (2003), he
uses the incomplete contract theory3 to explain this empirical finding4. The
1According to Antra`s (2003), “roughly one third of world trade is intra-firm trade. In
1994, 42.7 percent of the total volume of U. S. imports of goods took place within the
boundaries of Multinational firms, with the share being 36.3 percent for U. S. exports of
goods (Zeile 1997).”
2Feenstra (1998) reports, “between 1972 and 1990, imported intermediate inputs in-
creased from 5.3 percent of material purchases to 11.6 percent of material purchases.”
Other papers related to this issue are Audet (1996), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hum-
mels et al.(2001) and Yeats (2001).
3For example, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995)
4Similar approaches applied to international trade theory can be found in Antra`s
(2005), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005) and McLaren (2000). Grossman and
Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005) appeal to the idea of the incompleteness of contracts in the
general equilibrium framework. But in their papers, there is a constant returns to scale
matching process that occurs between the MNE and the intermediate goods supplier. For
this reason alone, the existing intermediate goods supplier can make a positive profit.
This crucially distinguishes Grossman and Helpman’s work from that of Antra`s. In my
contracts between the MNE in the north and the intermediate goods sup-
plier in the south are naturally incomplete. Because of this incompleteness,
the hold-up problem appears and as the consequence, the under-investment
in inputs of two sides comes forth. In the capital-intensive industry, the
investment of the MNE’s input becomes more important compared with the
intermediate goods supplier’s, so the MNE wants to integrate the interme-
diate goods supplier to improve its threshold point in the bargaining process
and to increase its own incentive to invest. As a result, the loss of efficiency
will be alleviated in the capital-intensive industry when the MNE integrates
the intermediate goods supplier in the south.
Antra`s and Helpman (2004) adopt a unified model to study the choice
of production location and the form of organization. The tradeoff between
FDI and outsourcing in their study is similar to Antra`s (2003), but the
governance cost, a new ingredient in the tradeoff, is higher in integration
compared with outsourcing. In fact, the weakness of their model is here,
as the assumption that the governance cost is higher in the integration case
is crucial to their results. In my paper, I will give an explanation for this
assumption and turn it into a result of the model. More precisely, the
reason why the governance cost is higher in the integration case is that
the monitoring from the northern owner is more costly compared with the
domestic monitoring.
Turning from the trade literature, I would like to review a classic ques-
tion in the contract theory of why some firms seek to integrate other firms
and different firms do not seek integration. Coase (1937) stresses the im-
portance of transaction costs when a firm wants to buy intermediate goods
from the supplier5. So there are some demerits in outsourcing. On the con-
trary, there are some demerits in integration also, such as higher governance
costs. Cre´mer (1995) stresses that the tradeoff between outsourcing and in-
tegration is a tradeoff between credible commitment and better information
environment. When a firm integrates another firm, it will get clearer infor-
mation about the integrated firm. But as the integrating firm has already
known the type of the integrated firm, it will become more costly for the
model, the independent intermediate goods supplier can also make a positive profit in
equilibrium. But the cause for this is the asymmetric information held by the supplier,
not the matching process.
5This approach in the contract theory has been developed largely by Williamson (1975,
1985).
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integrating firm to give incentives to the integrated firm to make it work
hard as compared with outsourcing. Schmidt (1996) uses a similar idea to
analyze the cost and benefit of privatization. Compared with their models,
the demerit of integration across border (i.e., FDI) in my model is also the
costly incentives, whereas the origin of this problem is the costly monitoring
from the foreign owner.
In my model, I use the contract theory to explain the economic force
behind the multinational firm’s choice of the form of organization. I will
focus on the comparison of two types of production: outsourcing in the
south and FDI. When going to the south for the production of intermediate
goods6, the MNE has two options and the first one is to outsource the
production to an independent supplier in the south7 (i.e. outsourcing in
the south). In this case, the asymmetric information problem occurs as
the productivity of intermediate goods production is the supplier’s private
information8. Accordingly, in the case of outsourcing in the south, the
multinational firm is faced with an adverse selection problem. Intuitively,
when the MNE and the stand-alone supplier which has private information
of its production cost negotiate the transfer pricing of intermediate goods,
it is impossible for the MNE to push the profit of the supplier to its outside
option in equilibrium9, since the MNE has to transfer rents to elicit a truthful
report of its productivity from the supplier. Therefore, the MNE has to
design an incentive compatible contract which involves non-linear pricing to
induce the intermediate goods supplier in the south to report its productivity
truthfully. Due to this, the MNE has to pay information rents.
When comparing between FDI and outsourcing in the south, we have to
investigate the inner structure of MNE’s southern affiliate and see what is
happening there. The tradeoff between them is that although the multina-
tional firm has to pay information rents when outsourcing, the unit labor
cost in this case is lower compared with the FDI case. This is because the
6The reason why the MNE goes to the south is that the wage rate in the south is much
lower than the north.
7In this case, the MNE is not a real MNE as it does not own foreign affiliates. For con-
venience, in this paper, I call the northern final goods maker that undertakes outsourcing
in the south the MNE also.
8In reality, there may be adverse selection problems for the MNE even the independent
intermediate goods supplier is located in the north. But we stress that it is more likely
that the adverse selection problem arises when two firms are located in different countries.
9In this model, the outside option is normalized to zero.
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southern owner of the stand-alone supplier can monitor southern employees
using a relatively lower cost. On the other hand, when the multinational
firm decides to integrate the intermediate goods supplier in the south, the
information about the supplier’s productivity will become clear. It will be-
come more costly for the northern owner of the supplier to induce southern
employees to work hard, however, as the monitoring from the north is more
costly compared with the domestic one. Intuitively, as the monitoring across
border is more costly, the northern owner will choose a lower monitoring in-
tensity and higher wage rates to make southern employees work hard. As
a result, the total unit labor cost which equals to the sum of the unit mon-
itoring cost and the wage rate is higher in the FDI case. We believe that
this is one important aspect of what is happening inside the MNE’s foreign
affiliate—owners from the developed countries monitor southern employees
less and pay them higher wage rates to make them work hard.
The hidden information problem (i.e. adverse selection problem) in the
outsourcing in the south case and the costly monitoring problem in the FDI
case are serious problems in practice, although they have been overlooked by
trade economists for many years10. In fact, in the field of international man-
agement, some researchers take them seriously. In Dunning (1993), “Such
cognitive deficiencies give rise to bounded rationality, opportunism, adverse
selection, moral hazard,” he writes, “This kind of market failure is par-
ticularly likely to be associated with cross-boarder transaction” (p.78). In
Rugman (1981), he writes, “There are presumably more imperfections and
greater transactions costs in international than in domestic markets. These
give rise to the MNE. It can enjoy worldwide economies of internal organi-
zation. These internal advantages must be sufficient to offset the additional
costs of operation abroad in unfamiliar political and economic environments
in order to have FDI replace potential indigenous production” (p.42). this
paper will shed some light on these important issues in international trade
theory.
The main result of this paper is that in the equilibrium, the MNE out-
sources the production of intermediate goods which are labor intensive and
10One exception is Horstmann and Markusen (1996). In their model, the MNE is faced
with an asymmetric information problem when contracting with a stand-alone agent in
the foreign country. However, different from my model, the demerit of the FDI in their
paper is assumed to be a one-time set-up cost.
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uses FDI to produce capital intensive intermediate goods. Due to this, my
paper’s main result is consistent with the empirical finding that, compared
with the outsourcing, the intra-firm trade (FDI) is concentrated in capital-
intensive industries. The intuition behind this result is that although the
adverse selection problem is not related to the capital intensity of produc-
tion, the importance of costly monitoring and higher labor costs in the FDI
case is crucially affected by the capital intensity. In other words, higher
labor costs hurt firms producing labor intensive intermediate goods more as
firms do not have to give any incentive to capital11. From above reasoning, it
is straightforward to see that while the main result of my paper is the same
as those of Antra`s (2003, 2005), the economic intuition contrasts markedly.
One thing I want to stress is the role of cross-border transaction. It can be
seen from the above reasoning that it is the cross-border transaction that
causes the adverse selection problem in the outsourcing case and the costly
monitoring problem in the FDI case. Because of this, this paper differs from
those papers concerning the decision of outsourcing and integration within
a country.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 gives a model
and calculates the expected profits in two cases. Section 3 compares them
and describes the production patterns in equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
The proofs of main results are relegated to Appendixes.
2 The Model
When going to the south for the production of intermediate goods, the MNE
has two options. It can integrate a southern intermediate goods supplier and
produce intermediate goods in its southern affiliate through its command.
The other option is to outsource the production of intermediate goods to a
stand-alone southern supplier through contracting.
11There are many reasons why the MNE does not want to use southern managers in
its southern affiliates such as the low quality of southern managers and the problem of
southern managers’ loyalty. Obviously, the northern owner can employ southern managers
to monitor southern employees. But in this case, the communication between them must
be much more difficult than the communication between the northern owner and northern
managers of the supplier. Consequently, in this paper, I assume that the communication
between the northern owner and southern managers is so difficult that the northern owner
always wants to employ northern managers to run its southern affiliate. We believe this
assumption is consistent with many examples in reality.
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2.1 Environment
There are two countries called the north and south. There are two factors—
labor and capital. Consumer’s preferences are such that a producer of final
goods y in industry j faces the following iso-elastic demand function12:
y = λjp
−1/(1−α)
j ,
where pj is the price of good and λj is a constant term that the producer
takes as given. The production technology for the intermediate goods sup-
plier in the south is Cobb-Douglas type:
x = θ
(
K
β
)β(
L
1− β
)1−β
,
where the parameter θ indicates the productivity of the intermediate goods
supplier and is uniformly distributed on [θ∗, 1] (0 < θ∗ < 1). What is
important in this setup is that the information about productivity is the
intermediate goods supplier’s private information when it stands out of the
MNE. For convenience, I assume that the production of final goods from
intermediate goods requires no further cost:
y = x.
The timing of events is stated as follow. At t0, the MNE decides whether
to integrate a southern intermediate goods supplier or to outsource the pro-
duction to a southern supplier. Through random matching, the MNE meets
a supplier who does not know its productivity of production at t0. At t1, the
value of θ is realized. If the MNE has already integrated this supplier, the in-
formation of productivity is also available for the MNE. At t2, owners of the
supplier decide their monitoring intensity and wage schedules for employ-
ees. At t3, the MNE and the supplier make decision about the production
plan and the transfer price through command (in the case of an integrated
supplier) or through contract (in the case of a stand-alone supplier). At t4,
12This demand function is derived from the CES utility function (See Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977)) such that 1
(1−α) is the elasticity of substitution and the price elasticity of demand.
The term λj depends on the total expenditure on industry j and prices of all commodities
sold in industry j.
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employees of the supplier choose their behavior (i.e. hard working or shirk-
ing) and the production occurs. At t5, production takes place; employees
of the supplier get their wages; the supplier obtains its monetary transfer
from the MNE for the delivery of intermediate goods; the MNE receives
intermediate goods. Before solving this game through backward induction,
we have to derive the optimal monitoring intensity and wage schedules.
2.2 Determination of Wage Schedules
The labor cost for the owner of the supplier is composed of two parts. The
first one is the wage paid to employees and the second one is the monitorng
cost. Because I consider homogenous employees in this model, only the
analysis of one wage contract is needed.
The employees of the intermediate goods supplier choose between hard
working and shirking. The disutility of hard working is d, while the disutility
of shirking is normalized to 0. Assume that the owner13 of the supplier
always wants to induce employees to choose hard working and the production
will be completed successfully with probability 1 under hard working14. In
order to do this, the owner has to exert monitoring with the intensity q to
every labor input. Monitoring intensity q means that if the employee shirks,
he will be caught shirking and fired with probability q. The employees being
fired at this stage can obtain the reservation wage rate-w elsewhere. I assume
that employees’ behavior and results of the production are noncontractible,
but can be verified by the owner. The owner of the supplier cannot fire
employees without demonstrated shirking15. Beased on the reason above,
the wage rate that induces employees to choose hard working (henceforth,
the incentive compatible wage rate) must satisfy16
w − d ≥ (1− q)w + qw.
The left-hand side of the above inequlity is the net benefit from hard working
13In reality, firms can be owned by more than one individuals. But in this paper, for
simplicity, I take owners of the supplier as a whole, and do not consider potential conflicts
between different owners.
14For example, when shirking means the failure of the production and hard working
means the success of the production, the owner of the supplier always wants to induce
employees to choose hard working.
15For the justification of these assumptions, see Calvo and Wellisz (1978).
16For the justification of this setup, see Pagano and Volpin (2005).
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and the right-hand side is the net benefit form shirking. Accordingly, the
incentive compatible wage rate is
w = w +
d
q
.
Intuitively, when the monitoring intensity decreases, the incentive compat-
ible wage rate will be increased as the firm wants to make the current job
more precious for the employee to prevent the employee from shirking. In
order to monitor employees, the owner has to incur some cost. The cost of
monitoring one labor input with intensity q is
M(q) = ηq2,
where η indicates the minitoring difficulty of the owner.
In any case (i.e. integrated or stand-alone), the owner of the supplier
always wants to minimize the unit labor cost which equals to w +M(q).
Obviously, there is a tradeoff between monitoring intensity and the incentive
compatible wage rate. When the monitoring intensity goes up, the incentive
compatible wage rate can be reduced as the chance of shriking without being
penalized decreases. But at the same time, the monitoring cost must goes
up. Solving the problem
min
q
(
w +
d
q
+ ηq2
)
,
we can get the optimal monitoring intensity and the optimal incentive com-
patible wage rate:
q∗(η) =
( d
2η
) 1
3 ; w∗(η) = w +
(
2ηd2
) 1
3 ; M(q∗(η)) =
(ηd2
4
) 1
3 .
The total unit labor cost equals to
w∗(η) +M(q∗(η)) = w + 3
(ηd2
4
) 1
3
.
Because in the case of outsourcing, it is the southern owner who monitors
southern employees and in the case of FDI, it is the northern owner (i.e.,
the owner of the MNE) who monitors southern employees, it is natural to
assume that the monitoring from the northern owner is more difficult than
that from the southern owner. Due to this, I make the following assumption.
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Assumption 1
ηn > ηs,
where ηn represents the monitoring difficulty of the northern owner and ηs
represents the monitoring difficulty of the southern owner. Due to the above
assumption, the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1 The optimal monitoring intensity is lower in the case of FDI;
the optimal incentive compatible wage rate, the unit monitoring cost and the
unit labor cost are higher in the case of FDI.
Proof: Because ηn > ηs, from above results, we have
q∗(ηn) < q∗(ηs) ; w∗(ηn) > w∗(ηs) ; M(q∗(ηn)) > M(q∗(ηs)).
If we define the unit labor cost as
w˜(η) = w∗(η) +M(q∗(η)),
the result that
w˜n ≡ w˜(ηn) = w∗(ηn) +M(q∗(ηn)) > w˜s ≡ w˜(ηs) = w∗(ηs) +M(q∗(ηs))
is straightforward. ¤
The above result tells us that the northern owner pays a higher wage rate
to induce employees to choose the same level of effort (i.e. hard working)
as in the case of outsourcing. Because the monitoring cost is relatively
high for the northern owner, as a natural response, the northern owner will
monitor less compared with the southern owner. But on the other hand, the
northern owner pays a higher wage rate to make employees work hard. The
employees will work hard even under a relatively less intensive monitoring,
as the wage premium in the MNE’s affiliate is higher and accordingly the
opportunity cost of shirking is higher. Because of this, the job of working at
the MNE’s affiliate is more precious for employees. In fact, This is exactly
what the theory of efficiency wage tells us. We believe that the explanation
of wage premium in MNEs’ affiliates from the viewpoint of monitoring can
shed light on some empirical findings17 and the result above can be seen
17Aitken et al. (1996) and Lipsey et al. (2004) find that even the education level
of workers and the profitability level of affiliates of MNEs have been control, the wage
premium in affiliates of MNEs still exist. In other words, the foreign ownership makes a
big difference.
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as an explanation for the higher governance cost in the integration case in
Antra`s and Helpman (2004), if we take the monitoring cost (M(q∗(η))) as
the governance cost.
2.3 Expected Profits
Because there are two subgames (i.e. the FDI case and the outsourcing
case), we derive the MNE’s expected profit in the case of outsourcing first.
As in this case, the stand-alone supplier holds some private information (i.e.
the value of θ), the adverse selection problem occurs when the MNE nego-
tiates with the independent supplier. The MNE has to design an incentive
compatible contract which makes the intermediate goods supplier report its
productivity truthfully. Because of this, the MNE has to give information
rent to the intermediate goods supplier and the supplier can make positive
expected profit in the equilibrium. The cost function of intermediate goods
is
c(x) = w˜1−βs r
βx/θ,
where w˜s is the unit labor cost in the outsourcing case and r is the capital
rental rate in the south. The MNE’s expected profit (V) and the intermedi-
ate goods supplier’s expected profit (U) are (T is the monetary transfer the
MNE has to pay to buy the intermediate goods and we use y = x.)
V = λ1−αj y
α − T (y),
U = T (y)− w˜
1−β
s rβy
θ
.
The objective function of the MNE is
ΠO =max
y
∫ 1
θ∗
[λ1−αj y(θ)
α − T (y(θ))] dθ
1− θ∗
s.t. T (y∗(θ))− w˜
1−β
s rβy∗(θ)
θ
≥ T (y∗(θˆ))− w˜
1−β
s rβy∗(θˆ)
θ
, ∀θˆ 6= θ
T (y∗(θ))− w˜
1−β
s rβy∗(θ)
θ
≥ 0, ∀θ
where y∗ is the optimal design of production plan based on the productivity
the supplier reports. The principal (the MNE) makes the decision of y∗ and
the agent (the intermediate goods supplier) takes it as given when deciding
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its strategy of reporting its productivity. The first constraint above is the
incentive compatible condition that in the equilibrium, the supplier which
has the productivity θ has the incentive to report its productivity truthfully.
The second constraint above is the individual rationality or participation
constraint condition that the supplier which has any possible produtivity
can earn non-negative profit in equilibrium. Through some calculation, the
above problem can be reduced to the following18:
ΠO = max
y
∫ 1
θ∗
[(
λ1−αj y
α − w˜
1−β
s rβy
θ
)− w˜1−βs rβy
θ2
(1− θ)
] dθ
1− θ∗ − U(θ
∗)
s.t. U(θ∗) ≥ 0,
y′(θ) > 0.
The term λ1−αj y
α− w˜1−βs rβyθ is the total surplus created by the MNE and the
supplier; the term w˜
1−β
s r
βy
θ2
is the information rent. When the intermediate
goods supplier is the most productive (i.e., θ=1), it can get information
rent most which equals to
∫ 1
θ∗(w˜
1−β
s rβy)/θ2dθ. On the contrary, when the
intermediate goods supplier is the most unproductive (i.e., θ = θ∗), it cannot
get any information rent (i.e.
∫ θ∗
θ∗ (w˜
1−β
s rβy)/θ2dθ = 0). The MNE takes
into account the information rent which it has to pay while maximizing the
total surplus. Solving the problem, we can get the expected profit in the
outsourcing case:
ΠO =
[
(1− α)λj
(
α
w˜1−βs rβ
) α
(1−α) (1− α)(1− θ∗ 1+α1−α )
(1 + α)(1− θ∗)
]
. (1)
Differentiating ΠO with respect to θ∗, we find that ΠO is a monotonic
increasing function of θ∗. There are two effects concerning the increase of
θ∗. The first one which I call the efficiency effect is a positive one. Because
the realized productivity of the intermediate goods supplier becomes higher
on average, the MNE will make more expected profit. The second effect
which I call the information rent effect is an ambiguous one. Although the
pure rent for the more productive supplier becomes less, as the range of the
type that it can mimic narrows, the distribution of information rent which
18The problem here is a mechanism design problem under asymmetric information about
agent’s continuous type. For details, see Mirrless (1971), Baron and Myerson (1982) or
Fudenberg and Tirole (chapter 7, 1991).
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the MNE has to pay now first-order stochastically dominates the former
distribution19. It turns out the total effect is positive.
Now, we turn to the FDI case. As there is no adverse selection prob-
lem20, the optimal strategy for the MNE is to set the quantity of production
which maximizes the total profit created by the headquarters and the for-
eign affiliate after learning the productivity of the supplier and then leave
zero profit to its southern affiliate through transfer pricing. Consequently,
the MNE’s objective function in the FDI case is
max
y(.)
λ1−αj y
α − w˜1−βn rβ
y
θ
,
where w˜n is the unit labor cost in the case of FDI. Solving this problem, we
get
y(θ) = λj
(
αθ
w˜1−βn rβ
)1/(1−α)
.
The expected profit in the FDI case is
ΠF =
∫ 1
θ∗
[(
λ1−αj y(θ)
α − w˜
1−β
n rβy(θ)
θ
)]
dθ
1− θ∗
= (1− α)2λj
(
α
w˜1−βn rβ
) α
1−α (1− θ∗ 11−α )
(1− θ∗) .
It is straightforward to see ΠF is an increasing function of θ∗. The economic
intuition is straightforward, since there is no adverse selection problem in
the FDI case. The only effect of an increase in θ is the efficiency effect which
is positive.
3 The Sorting of Production Patterns
In this section, we compare the expected profits in the outsourcing case and
the FDI case for the MNEs needing intermediate goods whose production
process has different capital intensities.
19In other words, the probability of being a more productive supplier increases and the
more productive supplier earns information rent more.
20I assume that if the MNE integrates the intermediate goods supplier, the information
about the productivity of the intermediate goods supplier becomes clear for the MNE.
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3.1 The Comparison between FDI and Outsourcing
First, we derive the condition that ensures the coexistence of FDI and out-
sourcing in equilibrium. It is easy to see that the ratio of the expected profit
in the outsourcing case over the expected profit in the FDI case is
ΠO
ΠF
=
(
w˜n
w˜s
)α(1−β)/(1−α)
1
L(θ∗)
,
where
L(θ∗) =
(1 + α)(1− θ∗ 1(1−α) )
(1− θ∗
(1+α)
(1−α) )
.
Here, we have Lemma 2 and Lemma 321.
Lemma 2
0 <
1
L(θ∗)
< 1
Lemma 3
L′(θ∗) < 0
The economic meaning of Lemma 3 is that when θ∗ goes up, which means
that the productivity difference in one industry narrows, the outsourcing
should be more profitable compared with the FDI. This is so, because there
is an additional effect from the improvement of southern suppliers’ pro-
ductivity in the outsourcing case—the asymmetric information problem has
been mitigated since the range that a more productive supplier can mimic
narrows. From Lemma 2, we have the following result.
If (
w˜n
w˜s
)α/(1−α)
>
(1 + α)(1− θ∗ 1(1−α) )
(1− θ∗ 1+α1−α )
,
then the FDI and outsourcing coexist in the equilibrium.
If (
w˜n
w˜s
)α/(1−α)
≤ (1 + α)(1− θ
∗ 1(1−α) )
(1− θ∗ 1+α1−α )
,
21Proofs are relegated to Appendix A and B.
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the FDI always dominates the outsourcing for any given value of β ∈ (0, 1),
since the asymmetric information problem is so severe that the MNE even
wants to produce the most labor intensive product within firm’s boundary
to resolve the information problem.
In the latter case, the cutoff point between FDI and outsourcing is neg-
ative. To make the story interesting, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (
w˜n
w˜s
)α/(1−α)
>
(1 + α)(1− θ∗ 1(1−α) )
(1− θ∗ 1+α1−α )
3.2 Capital Intensity and FDI
Under Assumption 2, we have a cutoff point βOF between OS and FS and
the following proposition22 .
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1−2, there exists one cutoff point (i.e.,
βOF = [1−((1−α) logL(θ∗))/(α log(w˜n/w˜s))] ∈ (0, 1)) between the oursourc-
ing and FDI. When β < βOF (i.e., the capital intensity of intermediate goods
production is relatively low.), the outsourcing is optimal for the MNE; when
β > βOF (i.e., the capital intensity of intermediate goods production is rel-
atively high.), the FDI is optimal for the MNE.
Because the proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward, we can use figure 1 to
illustrate this proposition. In figure 1, S(β), which euqals to ( w˜nw˜s )
α(1−β)/(1−α),
is the advantage of lower unit labor cost of outsourcing. L(θ∗) is the disad-
vantage of outsourcing in the south related to the adverse selection problem.
Compared with the disadvantage of outsourcing (i.e., L(θ∗)) being indepen-
dent of the variation of β, the advantage of outsourcing (i.e., lower unit labor
cost) is much more important when the capital intensity goes down as more
labor is needed in the production process. Consequently, when the produc-
tion is relatively labor intensive, the expected profit in the outsourcing case
exceeds that in the FDI case. Accordingly, under Assumption 2, we have a
cutoff point between outsourcing and FDI. From Proposition 1, we have the
following main result of this paper.
22See figure 1.
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Proposition 2 Compared with outsourcing, intra-firm trade (FDI) is heav-
ily concentrated in capital-intensive industries.
Although the adverse selection problem is not related to the capital
intensity of the production, the importance of costly monitoring and the
relatively higher unit labor cost in the FDI case is crucially affected by the
capital intensity. When the capital intensity goes up, the MNE pays less
wage premium to employees in the FDI case, as the production needs less
labor. Accordingly, The choice of FDI compared with outsourcing becomes
more attractive. As a result, MNEs needing the intermediate goods whose
production is capital intensive will choose FDI instead of outsourcing.
3.3 The Comparative Statics
It is interesting to see the relationship between θ∗ and the cutoff point βOF .
The following lemma is the result23.
Lemma 4 When θ∗ goes up, the cutoff point between outsourcing and FDI
(i.e., βOF ) increases.
An increase in θ∗ is good news for both types of MNEs which undertake
outsourcing and FDI because the average productivity of the supplier in
the south increases. It is better news for the MNEs which are engaged in
outsourcing as the productivity difference narrows and hence the adverse
selection problem has been mitigated. Melitz (2003) argues that a trade
liberalization in the southern intermediate goods suppliers’ indrustry forces
less productive intermediate goods suppliers to exit the market, hence as a
result, the productivity difference between suppliers in the south becomes
narrow. Our result predicts that trade liberalization entails the expansion
of the outsourcing of intermediate goods production to the south compared
with the FDI.
4 Concluding Remarks
I have presented a simple model using the contract theory to explain the
behavior of the multinational firm. The main idea is that if the production
of intermediate goods is labor intensive, the MNE will not use integration
23For proof, see appendix C.
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(i.e., FDI) to overcome the adverse selection problem as the problem of the
costly monitoring and the relatively higher labor cost for the FDI becomes
more severe. On the other hand, when the production of intermediate goods
is capital intensive, that problem for the FDI is less severe as the production
process needs less labor. Consequently, the MNEs will integrate southern
suppliers to produce capital intensive intermediate goods and outsource the
labor intensive intermediate goods to stand-alone southern suppliers.
This paper contributes to the theory of multinational firms in the fol-
lowing ways. First, The information problem has been studied in this paper
as the disadvantage of engaging in outsourcing, which, I think, has been
overlooked by the previous research. Second, this paper gives a new partial
explanation24 for the wage premium in the MNE affiliated companies: it is
more costly for the MNE to induce southern employees to work hard within
the boundary of the firm as the monitoring across border is more costly.
Finally, the adverse selection problem in the outsourcing case and the costly
monitoring problem in the FDI case are all derived from the cross border
transaction. Consequently, the cross border character of economic activities
(i.e., outsourcing and FDI) plays a crucial role in this paper’s scenario which
is different from the story of the economic activities within a country.
This paper has derived many empirical implications. As the south in my
model is refered to all developing countries which are heterogenous in various
aspects, one should expect without surprise that the outsourcing should
be commonly seen from the trade pattern in developing countries which
have better accounting systems as better acconting systems will alleviate
the uncertainty of the southern supplier’s productivity. The fact that for
the northern and southern country pair which use the same language, the
FDI is commonly seen from the bilateral trade pattern is not surprising
either given that the monitoring costs are small in such cases25. I hope
future empirical research can support these theoretical predictions.
24The reason why I call this a partial explanation is that in the model above, the wage
schedule is derived just based on the profit maximization of the firm. The behavior of
employees is overlooked for simplicity.
25In Caves (1996), he writes, “More readily documented, languages and cultures shared
between countries reduce MNE’s transaction costs, just as neighboring countries reduce
their communication and coordination costs” (p.56).
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2
Supposing that
(1− θ∗ 1+α1−α )
(1 + α)(1− θ∗ 1(1−α) )
≥ 1,
we get
T (θ∗) = (1− θ∗(1+α)/(1−α))− (1 + α)(1− θ∗1/(1−α)) ≥ 0.
But
dT
dθ∗
=
(1 + α)
(1− α)(θ
∗α/(1−α) − θ∗2α/(1−α)) > 0.
So T (θ∗) < T (1) = 0. A contradiction.
Accordinly, we have lemma 2:
0 <
(1− θ∗ 1+α1−α )
(1 + α)(1− θ∗ 1(1−α) )
< 1.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 3
Differentiating L with respect to θ∗, we get:
Sign
(
L′(θ∗)
)
= Sign
(
(1 + α)θ∗2α/(1−α)(1− θ∗1/(1−α))− θ∗α/(1−α)(1− θ∗(1+α)/(1−α))
)
= Sign
(
(1 + α)θ∗2α/(1−α) − αθ∗(1+2α)/(1−α) − θ∗α/(1−α)
)
Because y = θ∗x (0 < θ∗ < 1) is a convex function. By Jensen’s inequality,
we have:
α
(1 + α)
θ∗(1+2α)/(1−α) +
1
(1 + α)
θ∗α/(1−α) > θ∗2α/(1−α).
So, we have:
L′(θ∗) < 0.
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Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 4
From appendix B, we know that L(θ∗) is monotonically decreasing in θ∗ and
the cutoff point between outsourcing and FDI is
βOF = 1− (1− α) logL(θ
∗)
α log
(
w˜n/w˜s
) .
Therefore, an increase in θ∗ will lead an increase in βOF .
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Figure 1: The Cutoff Point of OFβ  
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